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In re Nilsson, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 101 (Dec. 26, 2013)1 
 
BANKRUPTCY: HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined whether a debtor may claim Nevada’s homestead exemption when 
he does not reside on the property but his minor children do. 
 
Disposition 
 
 “A debtor must actually reside on real property in order to properly claim a homestead 
exemption for that property.” 
 
Factual and Procedural History  
 
David and his wife, Kelli, purchased property in 1994 as joint tenants and subsequently 
built a home on it. In 2006, David moved out of the house, leaving Kelli and their two children to 
live there. Kelli filed for divorce that same year, which ultimately led to her and David each 
holding a half interest in the property as tenants in common. In 2011, over three years after the 
divorce decree, Kelli recorded a homestead declaration that listed the property as her individual 
homestead. Although David did not take part in the declaration, Kelli did note that his name was 
on the title of the property. 
Thereafter, David filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, in which he tried to claim the property 
as exempt pursuant to Nevada’s homestead exemption. The Bankruptcy trustee objected to the 
exemption because David had not resided in the property since 2006. The trustee also argued that 
David could not claim the exemption because he did not record a declaration of homestead. 
David contended that although he had not lived on the property for over three years, he should 
still be able to claim the homestead exemption to benefit his children. Furthermore, he argued 
that he could claim the exemption under the doctrine of constructive occupancy because his 
children still lived there. The bankruptcy court certified the question to the Nevada Supreme 
Court. 
 
Discussion  
 
The homestead exemption 
 
In Nevada, a homestead may be exempted from the bankruptcy estate.2 Only the statutory 
or constitutional provisions that establish this exemption may extend or limit it. While such 
provisions are construed liberally in favor of the debtor, the debtor must substantially comply 
with the provisions for the exemption to apply. To determine whether a debtor must actually 
reside on a property to qualify for the homestead exemption, the Court interpreted the 
constitutional and statutory provisions governing Nevada’s homestead law.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  By Keivan Roebuck.  
2 NEV. REV. STAT. 21.090(1)(l) (2013); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 30.  
Nevada law requires that a debtor must reside on real property in order to exempt that property 
as a homestead. 
 
The Court looked to the definition of “homestead” found in NRS 115.005(2)(a) and noted 
that it does not expressly state whether one must reside on his or her homestead. However, it 
does require that either a married couple or a single person “select” the homestead by written 
declaration, which is governed by NRS 115.020. When a married couple selects a homestead by 
declaration, at least one of them must reside on the premises at that time.3 A single person, on the 
other hand, must indicate that he or she is a householder,4 which the Court has interpreted as 
being the occupier of the house.5 
Furthermore, any claimant of property must state that it is their intention to claim it as 
their homestead.6 Here, David argued that the phrase “any claimant” indicated that a single 
person could declare a homestead that he or she did not live on, as this part of the statute did not 
have a residency or householder requirement. The Court rejected this argument, however, 
finding it to be inconsistent with NRS 115.020(2)(a), which requires single persons to declare 
that they are householders.   
 
David may not exempt the Reno property as a homestead under the doctrine of constructive 
occupancy.  
 
David argued that he should be able to claim constructive occupancy because his divorce 
was the only reason he moved out of his house. He also argued for constructive occupancy in 
order to protect his children that still lived on the property. The Court, however, pointed to 
precedent, which required that claimants reside on the property with the intent to use and claim it 
as their homestead when filing a declaration of homestead. Accordingly, it concluded that a 
homestead must be a claimant’s “bona fide residence.” Because David was not living on the 
property, the Court reasoned that it was not his bona fide residence. As such, it rejected David’s 
constructive occupancy argument and held that he could not claim the property under the 
homestead exemption.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the debtor’s children lived on the property, he did not actually reside on it and 
therefore could not claim it as his bona fide residence. The Court held that the debtor could not 
effectively declare the property as his homestead, and it refused to extend Nevada’s homestead 
law under the doctrine of constructive occupancy.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 NEV. REV. STAT. 115.020(2)(a)–(b) (2013).  
4 NEV. REV. STAT. 115.020(2)(a) (2013).  
5 Goldfield Mohawk Mining Co. v. Frances-Mohawk Mining & Leasing Co., 31 Nev. 348, 354, 102 P. 963, 965 
(1909).  
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